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Following an accident that occurred in a nuclear power 1 station at Three 
Mile Island (USA), the Commission decided to set up a group of high-level 
independent experts in the field of nuclear safety. 
The Group's task was to advise the Commission on all problems relating to 
the present situation regarding nuclear safety within the Community, 
including its implications where rad~ation protection is concerned, and to 
evaluate the activities conducted by Community institutions in this field 
for the purpose of formulating any suggestion that may serve as a basis for 
• measures to be taken by the Community. 
On completion of their deliberations, the experts submitted to the Commission 
a report giving their opinions and recommendations on various ~pecific 
subjects. Some of these recommendations are addressed to the competent 
authorities in the Member States and to the nuclear power station constructors 
and operators and others to the Commission. 
I 
The Expert Group has thus formulated independent views and recommendations 
for action that without doubt make a significant contribution to the thinking 
in the Member States and the Community on problems regarding nuclear safety. 
I The Commission has noted that certain recommendations are already put into 
/ 
practice in the Member States while others are also already the subject of 
Community activities in pursuance of the Euratom Treaty. A third category 
of recommendations covers aspects that fall within the virtually exclusive 
responsibility of the Member States and in respect of which the Commission's 
role can only be to promote dialogue. 
Taken ae a whole, the recommendations addressed to the Commission will have to 
be studied in detail, in particular where they must be appraised in relation 
to the obligations deriving from the Euratom Treaty, before any new proposals 
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for action can be drawn up. The Commission attaches special importance to ~ 
the recommendations on: 
- the development of consistent administrative procedures for recording 
the individual dose equivalents accumulated by "migrant" maintenance 
workers throughout the Community; 
- the establishment, in conjunction with power station operators, of a 
European Equipment Reliability Data System; 
- the establishment of a system for the rapid communication of information 
on abnormal events occurring in nuclear power stations; 
- attempts to find common approaches to reactor siting; 
- the compilation of a list of conventions and agreements between Member 
States on information and assistance in the event of an emergency; 
- the holding of seminars on simulators and control-room layout; 
- the promotion of regular exchanges of information on improved maintenance 
procedures between reactor designers and operators in the various Member 
States. 
The Commission considered, however, that there was no need to wait for 
specific proposals for any new activities to be prepared before forwarding, 
for information, the report of the Expert Group to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. 
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CHAPI'ER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Group was established as a result of the Corranission Decision of 16 May 
1979 (reproduced in Appendix 1) and the members were appointed by September 
1979. The Group comprised: H J Dunster, 
D G H Latzko 
D Smidt 
S Villani 
J Van Caeneghem was appointed by the Corranission to be our Secretary. We held 
our first meeting on 2 October 1979 and elected H J Dunster as Chairman. We 
have met approximately monthly thereafter. In total we have held seven 
meetings. 
1.1 The Aim and Scope of our Work 
In keeping with the Corranission' s decision, our aim has been to provide the 
Corranission with suggestions concerning future Corrantmlty action in the field of 
nuclear safety. While this aim by itself provides for certain limitations in 
the scope because of the Corranission' s role in nuclear safety, which is 
complementary to that of the Member States, the terms of reference set out in 
the Corranission's decision are so wide that we, as a group of four with a staff 
of one, found it imperative to define further limits to the scope. This was 
first set out to the Corranission in the following statement: 
"The Group considered the mandate defined for us in the Corranission 
Decision of 16 May 1979. 
We reviewed the very broad scope implied by article 2.1 of that decision 
against the inevitable limitations imposed in practice by the time and 
effort available for our work and against the extent of our individual 
expertise. 
We concluded that we should concentrate our efforts on topics which we 
considered to be important to the definition of the Corranunity' s future 
role in nuclear safety and agreed to interpret article 2.1 and to assess 
the priorities for the items in article 2. 2 in that light". 
The practical development of this statement led us to exclude from our 
considerations topics in which we, as a group, felt we lacked the necessary 
expertise: physical plant protection, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, 
radioactive waste disposal and the decorranissioning of nuclear installations. 
Apart from our own limitations, we would not advocate the discussion of 
physical plant protection in widely accessible reports such as the present, as 
this might create more risks than benefits. We were encouraged to exclude 
reprocessing and waste disposal by our awareness that a comprehensive and 
authoritative review of the relevant technologies had recently been completed 
in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). Decorranissioning 
is also the subject of international discussion which we expect will continue. 
We have concentrated our discussion of the Corranunity's research prograrrane on 
the initiation and management of prograrrane items. An independent review of 
the content of the prograrrane, even if limited to reactor safety, would need 
substantially more effort than was provided for in setting up this group. 
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Although the Group was established as the result of the accident at Three Mile 
Island, our terms of reference have led us to examine a number of aspects of 
the Community' s work in nuclear safety in a general way, while keeping the • , 
lessons of the Three Mile Island accident in mind. Much of our work has, 
therefore, been of a general nature. Its technical content focuses on the 
reactor aspects of nuclear safety. Where we have needed to be specific to a 
particular reactor system we have dealt with the pressurised water reactor 
(PWR} because this is the most widespread type of reactor in the Community. 
1. 2 Q.lr Report 
There are wide variations in the extent to which Member States are involved 
with nuclear power. Some points are made in the report which will already be 
commonplace to many people. Nevertheless, the report should be heeded by all 
concerned. Nuclear safety is of Community-wide -. indeed, of world-wide -
importance because a bad accident anywhere in the world would have major 
repercussions everywhere. The accident at Three Mile Island had almost no 
consequences for public health but its llnp6ct across the World has been very 
substantial. 
In the remainder of this report we deal with, and make recommendations on, a 
number of topics mainly of a technical nature. In some cases we have included 
more detailed material in appendices. Finally, in Chapter 10, we make some 
general recommendations and draw some general conclusions. 
Our task has been to advise the Commission, and many of our recommendations 
therefore deal with specific Commission functions. However, we are concerned 
with nuclear safety in the Community and some of our recommendations deal more 
generally with nuclear safety issues. We hope these recommendations will be 
of interest to the national authorities of the Member States as well as to 
the Commission. 
1.3 Acknowledgements 
We are very grateful to our secretary for the excellent work he has done in 
arranging our meetings and dealing with our working papers and records. We 
are also grateful to the Commission and its staff for the substantial flow of 
information which they have provided and for the convenient arrangements which 
they have llOOe for our meetings. 
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CHAPI'ER 2 
-· SAFETY CRITERIA AND SAFETY ASPECTS OF THE DESIGN OF PRESSURISED WATER REACIDRS 
2.1 Introduction 
While the Three Mile lsland reactor was a Babcock and Wilcox design, only one 
of which is presently under construction in Europe, many of the lessons learnt 
from the accident at Three Mile Island are of a general nature. Our approach 
in the review of reactor safety aspects has therefore been to first look at 
the two I:wR designs predominant in the Community, viz. that deriving from 
Westinghou89 and used in France, Italy and Belgium, and the Kraftwerk Union 
{KWU) design used in Germany and the Netherlands, and investigate some safety-
related generic differences between these two designs. we concluded that these 
differences were due principally to differences in design philosophy rather 
than in national criteria or requirements. we then proceeded to establish the 
main lessons from the Three Mile Island accident that might be generally 
applicable to the safety of PWRs in the Community. Finally, we briefly state 
our views on the usefulness of harmonisation efforts by the Commission 
concerning safety criteria and regulatory rquirements. 
One very important point for the safety of FWRs is the integrity of the 
reactor pressure vessel and the primary circuit. Because of the comprehensive 
national efforts and the regular meetings of international specialist 
committees, which provide for detailed studies and for the adequate exchange 
of information in this area, the Group has not discussed this topic. 
4f There is one notable way in which European practice differs from that in the 
United States of America. Generally speaking, the electricity supply 
companies in the Community either supervise themselves the design and 
construction of entire plants or arrange for the design and construction to be 
in the hands of a single large and experienced vendor having effective 
feedback of operational experience. In the United States, it is common for 
the nuclear island to be provided by one supplier and the remainder of the 
plant by others. we believe that there are significant safety advantages in 
the former basis of supply, as it avoids the risks of interface difficulties 
that may arise from the dependence of a utility on information supplied by 
vendors with separate responsibilities. 
2.2 A Comparison of Safety Principles and Design of I:wRs in the Community 
We have considered a number of safety systems in which we see significant 
differences between the Westinghouse and the KWU designs. Some features of 
other European reactors have also been taken into account. 
2.2.1 Redundancy and Diversity in Engineered Safeguards 
In general terms, redundancy is provided to ensure that single failures cannot 
invalidate a safety system, while diversity between redundant systems is 
introduced to reduce the probability that a common-mode failure will 
invalidate several equivalent systems at the same time. Redundant systems may 
be completely independent {not interconnected) at all stages of a sequence of 
functions, or they may be interconnected so that the sequence of a function 
can be diverted from one chain to another in the case of a partial failure. 
The former arrangement gives a very simple system of control and provides 
a high standard of protection against faulty operation. '!be interconnected 
system, however, gives greater operational flexibility, which can·be value to 
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skilled operators, but which may sometimes be achieved at the expense of a 
loss in genuine redundancy. In particular, the necessary degree of redundancy 
may be omitted from the interconnection. For example, a single component, 
such as a storage tank, may service all the otherwise redundant systems. Such 
a provision would be prohibited by a rigid refusal to accept interconnected 
systems. In short, while interconnection does not of itself result in a 
reduction of redundancy, its use in practice often has that effect. 
There is a close relationship between the degree of redundancy adopted and the 
emphasis placed on diversity. For example, Westinghouse plants have diverse 
driving mechanisms for auxiliary feed-water pumps, one being electrically 
driven and the other driven by a steam turbine. The KWU system uses more 
redundancy but the same type of; drive mechanism, though with diverse design 
and separate power supplies. Diversity has obvious merit in principle, but 
introduces the problems of more complex maintenance procedures. As far as we 
are aware, the advantages can be demonstrated theoretically, but have not been 
observed in practice. 
2.2.2 Automation 
The use of automatic arrangements to control reactors in both normal and 
abnormal situations has been increasing and the differences between reactor 
systems depend more on the date of design than on the difference between 
manufacturers. Automation has a number of identifiable advantages: 
it can help to avoid operator errors: 
it provides an integration of different inputs of information; and 
thus relieves the operators of unnecessary detailed interpretation; 
it can initiate those actions which are thought always to be 
appropriate in abnormal situations and thus can reduce to a minimum 
those decisions which are a matter of judgement; 
it provides necessary time for careful consideration of the 
subsequent operator actions. 
There is an increasing tendency for plants to be designed so that operations 
in the 30 minutes following a shut-down initiated by a fault can be conducted 
automatically and can be overriden by the operator only in exceptional 
circumstances. 
The successful specification of the automatic action following this type of 
shut-down requires that the designers shall be able to foresee the possible 
situations sufficiently clearly to establish shut-down procedures that are 
appropriate in all circumstances. This does not mean that they have to be 
able to predict all possible accidents, but only that the proposed automatic 
actions should be reasonably appropriate in all situations, whether foreseen 
or not. We believe, and the accident at Three Mile Island supports that 
belief, that design weaknesses in automatic systems of this kind are less 
likely to lead to trouble than manual intervention by operators in situations 
which neither they nor the designers had previously foreseen. 
Associated with automation is the use of data processing to display 
information to the operators. Even if the operators do not need to intervene 
in the 30 minutes following the initiation of a shut-down, they need to have 
detailed information about the state of the plant and the developnent of 
abnormal conditions in order to predict what is likely to happen and to plan 
the longer period operations. In particular, they need information on which 
to base the initiation of emergency plans, both on- and off-site. We return 
to this point in Chapter 6. While existing European systems are better than 
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those at Three Mile Island, ·additional improvements still need to be 
considered. 
2.2.3 The Procedures for Dealing with Small Leaks in the Primary Circuit 
There is a difference between the KWU and Westinghouse designs in respect of 
the provision of high pressure injection of water following the occurence of 
small leaks in the·primary circuit. The Westinghouse reactors, like other US 
designs, have provision for injection at, and above, the normal primary 
circuit operating pressure of make-up water and of a supplementary shut-down 
solution containing boron. In KWU reactors, the secondary system is used 
automatically to reduce the primary pressure by reducing the primary tempera-
ture at a rate of 100 K/h. Emergency core-cooling water cannot be injected 
until the primary pressure has fallen to 11 MPa (110 bars), the zero-flow 
delivery head of the HP injection pumps. Framatome has also introduced a 
similar automatic temperature reduction. 
Although at Three Mile Island the automatic injection of emergency cooling 
water was initiated at a pressure well below the normal operating pressure of 
the primary circuit, the capability of the HP injection system to produce 
pressures above this operating pressure appears to have introduced into 
operator training the concern that there would be a danger of forcing steam 
out of the relief valves until the primary circuit went "solid". This concern 
would not have arisen if all the injection systems had been designed to 
operate only at pressures below the normal operating pressure. 
Nevertheless, the failure of the relief valve to close could still have led to 
a dangerous situation and, for this reason, most European PWRs have been 
supplied with automatic block valves in series with the pressuriser relief 
valves. 
2.3 Some Lessons from the Accident at Three Mile Island 
In the US there has been a marked exphasis on the operator weaknesses demons-
trated by the accident at Three Mile Island. This accident, however, also 
provided a number of detailed lessons for the designers of nuclear power 
plants. We consider the following design issues to be of particular 
relevance. 
1. One of the most important lessons was the emphasis on the need to 
consider a wide range of accident conditions and not to concentrate 
on only the worst accidents. A great deal of attention has been 
paid to loss-of-coolant accidents involving major leaks in the 
primary circuit but, until recently, inadequate attention has been 
given to the consequences of small leaks. 'f£ts has occurred in 
spite of the fact that the Rasmussen report had identified a 
number of small loss-of-coolant events which could lead to partial 
melting of the core. In this connection it is noteworthy that 
European reactors have several design features which makes them 
less susceptible to the effects of small leaks than, for example, 
the design adopted at Three Mile Island. 
2. The second lesson concerns the undesirability of allowing operators 
to intervene to reverse safety measures which have been initiated 
automatically. They should, however, be permitted to supplement 
safety measures which should have occurred but which, for some 
reason, have failed to do so. The 30 minutes period referred to 
above and now employed by all European vendors is a good working 
solution. 
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3. There is a neecd for instn.nnentation capable of acquiring all 
relevant information on the conditions in the primary gystem 
(liquid level, ooiling margin, core temperatures) under emergency lit-
as well as normal operating conditions. 
4. Good design of the control room instrumentation and the use of data 
processing are important in ensuring the transfer of all relevant 
information to the operators under emergency a.s well as normal 
operating conditions. 
5. In view of the subsequent event at Crystal River all the 
instrumentation providing information or control functions in the 
control room should be equipped with power supplies of a 
reliability comparable with that needed for essential safety 
instrumentation. 
2.4 Recommendations 
1. Reactor systems should be designed to provide for automatic sequences 
for shutting down and cooling the reactor after all faults. Only in very 
exceptional circumstances should these sequences be subject to cancellation by 
the operators in the first thirty minutes or so, but provision for 
reinforcement by the operator of some functions is desirable. 
2. The primary system instrumentation should include indicators of liquid 
level in the core or pressure vessel and ooiling margin. 
3. There should be a comprehensive provision of relevant information to 
the operator using the techniques of data processing. To this end, the 
Commission should urgently organise seminars on simulators and on control room 
layout, bringing together utilities, reactor designers, equipment suppliers, 
architect engineers, and ergonomists. In addition, the Commission should make 
the maximum use of the developnents in the communication links between 
operators and process plant achieved in the framework of the OECD project at 
the Halden reactor. 
4. Many new developnents can be applied in practice only to new reactor 
oesigns. However, significant technical improvements should also be applied 
to existing plants whenever this can be done without unreasonable economic 
pena.l ties • 
2.5 The Harmonisation of Criteria and Regulatory Requirements 
Substantial emphasis has been placed by the Commission on the advantages of 
harmonisation of criteria and regulatory requirements, but there has been a 
tendency to reduce this emphasis in recent years. It is now clear that there 
will be only a limited international trade in the Community in complete 
reactor systems, and that there will be no need for one Member State to accept 
the decisions of other states' licensing authorities on reactor design 
matters. In this situation, one of the principal values of harmonisation is 
in providing, as a common objective, a minimum standard of safety. Harrnonised 
criteria for reactor assessment would also help in resolving some of the 
difficulties faced by a Member State in accepting a power plant near its 
frontier but in another country. 
More comprehensive moves towards harmonisation would be of value if the 
Community were moving rapidly towards the provision of a central licensing and 
regulatory authority for the whole of the Community. We do not think that 
this is sufficiently imninent to justify any determined effort to achieve 
harmonisation from the centre. We support the way in which the Commission is 
now working, in particular by the provision of dialogues and discussions, and 
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by the identification and exchange of information and documentation on safety 
~ methodology, criteria, codes and standards, and on specific safety programmes 
applicable to light water reactors in the various member states. 
In saying this, we are conscious that harmonisation of detailed regulatory 
arrangements · has certain disadvantages which have to be outweighed by the 
advantages: in particular we believe that a closely harmonised system would be 
cumbersome, complicated and inflexible in operation, and would tend to operate 
in a remote manner because of the inevitable distance between the Corranission 
and the licensees in· the Member States. There is also a tendency to reach 
agreement in harmonisation discussions only on the basis of the least 
restrictive standards and there is often a failure to realise that there may 
be several acceptable solutions to any single problem. Hence the relationship 
between the harmonisation of safety criteria and safety itself tends to be 
remote. 
2.5.1 Recommendations 
1. Harmonisation in the field of nuclear safety should proceed as a 
natural process resulting from a continued series of discussions and not as 
the result of a policy imposed from the centre. 
2. The Commission should retain its function as a clearing house for 
information and ideas and thus encourage this natural process. 
References 
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CHAPTER 3 
POWER PLANT STAFF 
3.1 Operators and Supervisors 
The first area of ·concern is the selection ,of reactor operating staff. We 
recommend that any person selected for reactor operator training should have 
at least several years' experience in a position involving both significant 
personal responsibility and long uneventful periods. Typical jobs in point 
are found, for example, in the operation of fossil-fired electric generating 
plant, chemical or petrochemical plant, or marine propulsion plant. 
Furthermore, candidates should be subjected to and pass ability tests, 
possibly of a kind similar to those applied to prospective airline pilots. 
Finding suitable candidates answering such requirements obviously implies that 
they be offered commensurate career opportunities. 
3.1.1 Training 
Training itself may be carried out either by the utility at an existing 
nuclear power plant, by a separate training school, or by both. In each case, 
both curriculum and instructor qualifications should be subject to periodic 
review by the national safety authority (or an independent body designated by 
that authority). No such training should be regarded as satisfactory unless 
each trainee has regular access to a control room simulator where he is 
trained to react properly to progressively more complex transients of the sort 
he may encounter in the plant which he is to operate. This implies that 
simulators should be programmed to include serious events, such as loss of • 
primary coolant from small breaks followed by failures of the safety systems. 
We recommend that the Commission should organize a seminar to bring together 
all parties concerned with the use of reactor simulators for the purpose of 
defining such transients and exchanging information on the required software. 
Training should also cover situations requiring post-damage control. Operator 
behaviour in such situations should be rehearsed during emergency exercises, 
the scope of which should be defined in concert with the national safety 
authority. . The latter should also be informed of any changes in operating 
instructions resulting from such emergency drills. 
In addition to formal training, attention should be paid to career planning so 
as to provide a sound basis of practical experience on the job. Neither 
formal training nor practical experience is sufficient on its own. 
3.1.2 Approval of Operating Staff 
The arrangements for the approval of operating staff should satisfy the 
requirements of the national safety authority. Where this body decides to 
delegate the power of approval to either the utility or a third party (e.g. a 
reactor training school), such delegation should be defined in writing and 
remain subject to withdrawal, either on an institutional or on an individual 
basis, at the national authority's discretion. 
In view of the differences in practice existing between Member States, we do ·• 
not recommend mandatory re-approval. Nevertheless, the national safety 
authority should verify that simulator training and medical checkups take 
place at regular intervals, preferably not less than once every second year. 
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3.1.3 Control-room Layout 
No amount of training can avoid operator errors due to inadequate control-room 
lay-out, instrumentation and data processing. This supports the recommenda-
tion made in Section 2.4 concerning control room layout. In addition, we 
believe that the design of control-rooms will not be fully successful unless 
operting staff who have experience of work in control rooms are directly 
involved in the design work. 
3.1.4 Operating Procedures 
An important aspect in the effective functioning of the operators, and one 
that tends to be easily overlooked, is the availability of clear, unequivocal, 
and up-to-date operating procedures and instructions. Much may be gained by 
the continuous involvement of the operators themselves in the generation and 
adaptation of these procedures and instructions. While this is a matter of 
internal organization at the utilities, its importance to nuclear safety 
appears such as to warrant the suggestion that national safety authorities try 
to stimulate operator involvement. We recommend that the preparation of these 
procedures and instructions should be made part of the national safety 
authority's requirements. 
3.2 Maintenance Staff 
While the above material specifically refers to operating staff, great care 
should be taken to ensure proper training of, and instructions to, maintenance 
staff. Both probabilistic studies, and the actual accident experience at 
Three Mile Island, indicate the high relevance of maintenance procedures to 
nuclear safety. It should not be forgotten that the hostile environment and 
• the rigorous safety requirements combine to create a significantly heavier 
burden for maintenance staff in nuclear plants than is carried by their 
counterparts in fossil-fueled power stations. It seems desirable that this be 
reflected in both their training and their status. 
3.2.1 Radiation Exposure Management 
In existing PWRs, more than 80% of the total collective dose equivalent is 
received during maintenance operations (the percentage for BWRs is of the same 
order}. There is also a tendency for the average annual collective dose 
equivalent per unit of energy produced to increase over the first 10 years of 
operation for PWRs in OECD countries. There are variations with the year of 
commissioning and between countries and reactor designs, but overall, there 
are strong grounds for working toward reduction in both individual and 
collective dose equivalents by a number of technical measures. These include 
the reduction of corrosion in the primary circuit by improved water chemistry, 
increased purification of the primary coolant, appropriate materials in the 
primary circuit increased accessibility by attention to layout, and the 
increased use of remotely controlled maintenance tools. The necessary 
research and development work should be encouraged and should be supported by 
the Community. In the meantime, particular attention should be paid to the 
recording and control of the dose equivalent received by "migrant" maintenance 
workers to reduce the likelihood of their receiving excessive dose 
equivalents. 
3.3 Senior Management 
Line management staff, including senior management, must have sound technical 
knowledge of their plant and must be supported by technical staffs with access 
to recent developments and experience elsewhere. 
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3.4 Recommendations 
1. The national safety authorities of Member States and the utilities 
should review their practices in the light of the comments and suggestions 
made in this Chapter. 
2. The Cormmnission should promote the regular exchange of information on 
improved maintenance procedures between reactor designers and operators in 
different Member States. 
3. The Commission should promote consistent administrative procedures for 
recording the individual dose equivalents accLmlii\ulated by "migrant" reactor 
maintenance workers throughout the Community. 
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CHAPI'ER 4 
INFORMATION AND DATA 13..2\NKS CN ACCIDENTS AND EQUIPMENT FAILURES 
The future assessment of the safety of nuclear installations depends heavily 
on a detailed and thorough understanding of failures that have occurred in the 
past. Many countries, including some of the Member States of the Community, 
are establishing data banks on the types and frequencies of failure of 
different kinds of equipment and complete systems, and an increasing amount of 
information is now available commercially. A good deal of this information is 
still fragmentary and not all of it is widely available because of proprietary 
limitations. Discussions have been going on for some time, both in the 
Community and in OECD, with a view to providing a more comprehensive flow of 
information. In particular, a feasibility study has been carried out for a 
European Reliability Data System. 
4.1 The Need for a Central Service 
We believe that there is a valuable function to be provided by a central 
service run by the Community. Such a service would provide access to a wide 
range of national data banks, but we think it should not attempt to duplicate 
these banks; rather, it should provide a central provision for interrogating 
the existing national systems, partly in reply to specific questions put to 
the service, and also on a more general basis with the aim of disseminating 
information about abnormal events and the reliability of components and 
equipment. The Commission will need to establish some degree of compatibility 
between national systems, particularly concerning the types of data stored and 
the methods of retrieval • 
In giving support to the proposal, we wish to draw attention to a number of 
points:-
(1) It will be important to define the objectives and functions of the 
service with considerable clarity. 
(2) The service will be worthwhile only if it is supported by an 
adequate number of clients. Given such support, it will be of 
considerable importance to the Community and should not necessarily 
be required to find all its funds from commercial fees. 
(3) To be successful, the service will need to be more than a simple 
information service. It will need to have experienced professional 
staff who can solve the classification problems inherent in this 
kind of work, who can advise custoruers, and who can also provide a 
regular outward flow of information. 
(4) The service will need a close collaboration with the electricity 
generating industry, possibly through a formal link with UNIPEDE. 
(5) In addition, utilities operating nuclear power plants should employ 
technical staff, fully abreast of developments in the nuclear power 
field, and capable of making full use of the service. 
4.2 Recommendations 
1. A common form for reporting abnormal events should be agreed upon between 
the Commission and the Member States. 
- 11 -
2 The Commmission should view seriously the results of the feasibility 
study for a European Reliability Data System and take into account the views 
of the Advisory C<?~ittee fonthProgr~e Managethment, . Rea<;:to~ S~fety, abowhich -• 
supports the propos1t1on. I e proJect meets e cr1ter1a 1nd1cated ve, 
we recommend that it should be established. 
• 
• 
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CHAPI'ER 5 
RADIATION PROTECTION ASPECTS OF 'IHE SITING OF NUClEAR REACTORS 
·~ The choice of a reactor site depends on a large number of characteristics, the 
predominating ones of which are those of engineering and radiation protection. 
For engineering reasons, the site must have suitable foundations, an adequate 
area of land, convenient access, and an adequate supply of cooling water. The 
radiation protection factors include the ease of applying counter-measures 
after an accident, the minimising of the consequences of an accident, and the 
provisions for the routine release of radioactive wastes. In addition, it is 
desirable that· the site should be free of such disadvantageous features as a 
liability to flood and a likelihood of significant earthquakes. Other aspects 
include such features as the commercial availability of the site, the 
availability of labour for construction and operation, proximity to the 
principal electrical loads, and the reliability of the connections to the 
power grid. Finally, it must be remembered that the views of the local 
pop.llation are an essential factor in the selection of any site. Acceptance 
criteria for the local population, however, are so multi-faceted, and vary so 
strongly throughout the Community and with time, that their discussion would 
be beyond the sco:pe of this report. 
This report deals only with the radiation protection aspects of siting and, of 
these, only with the effects of accidents. Given the adequate provision of 
cooling water, the routine disposal of radioactive waste from nuclear reactor 
sites can be achieved in ways which do not noticeably change the pre-existing 
natural background level of radiation. 
5.1 General Issues 
• 
(2) 
Accidents to nuclear reactors can have a wide range of consequences and there 
has been a natural tendency to give priority to the reduction of both the 
likelihood and the consequences. of serious accidents. It is thus to be 
expected that there will be a relationship between the severity of an accident 
and the probability of its occurrence, with the worst accidents being less 
probable. This tendency has not been incorporated formally into licencing 
arrangements: it has been found more useful to use it as a design objective, 
in the form of a quantitative relationship between scale and probability. The 
first of such relationships was that proposed by Farmer(l), where the 
magnitude of the accident was expressed as the activity of the nuclide iodine 
131 released to the atmosphere. This is one of the more important materials 
in the case of an uncontained accident and can be regarded as representative 
of a number of volatile fission products. 
There are several different approaches that can be adopted to assess the 
influence that the choice of site might have on the consequences of accidents. 
All these approaches require the postulation that very severe accidents are 
possible. Reactor accidents are, in any event, rare and most of them would 
have such small consequences that they do not influence siting considerations. 
It is sufficient to concentrate on three possible aspects. The first of these 
is the long-term effect on health from a single specified accident, or from a 
probability distribution of accidents. The principal long-term effects to be 
expected are possible additional cases of cancer and, in smaller numbers, of 
serious genetic defects in the next few generations. With the conventional, 
and probably conservative, assumption of a linear dose-effect relationship 
without threshold, a measure of all these effects is given by the estimation 
of the collective dose equivalent, or, for those accidents which do not 
release significant amounts of alpha-emitting materials, ie for the great 
majority of accidents, the collective absorbed dose. 
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For many accidents, the possible long-term effects are the only significant 
health effects. However, for large accidents and near-in populations, the 
organ doses may be large enough to cause short-term health effects, such as 
acute radiation damage to the thyroid or lungs, or the whole-body doses may be • 
large enough to cause radiation sickness and some fatalities. The second 
factor to be considered is then the number of people whose absorbed doses are 
likely to reach the levels capable of causing serious early effects. The 
collective absorbed dose is no longer relevant. 
Thirdly, there is the consideration of counter-measures. Some protection of 
the population can be provided by counter-measures such as evacuation, the 
administration of stable iodine to provide protection against effects of the 
radioisotopes of iodine and, on a longer time-scale, the prevention of the 
normal distribution and consumption of foodstuffs grown in the locality. The 
choice of site may influence the feasibility of putting these counter-measures 
into effect and, in particular, may influence the numbers of people likely to 
be involved in urgent counter-measures, such as evacuation or the issue of 
stable iodine. 
These counter-measures, if effectively applied, will result in a substantial 
decrease in collective and individual doses. However, they may also have a 
significant deleterious effect on those involved. For example, considerable 
human misery results from any evacuation of which the duration is uncertain. 
The number of people subjected to counter-measures in the event of an accident 
is influenced by the choice of site and is, therefore, the third factor to be 
considered. 
The consequences of persistent contamination of land, homes and industrial 
installations may well prove to be among the most severe consequences of a 
serious accident to a nuclear reactor. The influence of this problem on the 
choice of a site is not simple and cannot be reduced to a simple quantity, 
such as the number of people involved or the level of dose. 
Clearly, the relationship between these three factors and the population 
distribution at the site will be complex, and the comparisons between one site 
and another are not likely to be the same for the separate factors. In 
particular, estimates of the long-term health effects are likely to be 
significantly influenced by small doses to a large number of people at great 
distances, while the possibility of counter-measures and, more importantly, of 
early health effects, will put emphasis on the number of people close to this 
site. The final decisions as to the choices between sites will thus depend on 
the importance attached to these various factors, to the engineering features 
of the reactors, and to the non-quantitative features of the site and its 
surroundings. 
5.2 Simplified Comparisions 
In order to illustrate the inter-relationship between the scale of possible 
accidents and the choice of a site, simplified calculations have been carried 
out using a standard mixture of radionuclides in the source term and a 
simplified meteorological and dosimetric model. These calculations were not 
in any way intended to replace site specific calculations, nor were they used 
to evaluate the absolute magnitude of the possible consequences of an 
accident. They merely made it possible to see how the different siting ·•· 
factors discussed above might influence the order in which sites were 
selected. They also allowed the effects of different accident distributions 
and of different lower limits on the integration of collective dose to be 
demonstrated. 
.. 
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The calculations have been carried out for four European reactor sites and for 
two hypothetical sites. Of the four real sites, two are rural and two are 
more heavily populated. Most of the calculations relate to the population in 
• the average sector round the site, but for two sites more detailed data have 
been used to compare the most highly populated sectors with the average. The 
two hypothetical sites are near and within a major urban area. 
Although all these calculations have been carried out by a simplified method 
using typical weather conditions and, usually, nominal population distribu-
tions, the results are. not inconsistent with those of more detailed site-
specific calculations. The use of bad weather conditions and specific 
population distributions in particular directions will change the absolute 
magnitude of the consequences of an accident but will have little effect on 
the comparison. between sites unless there are significant site-specific 
combinations of weather conditions(2)and population distributiol)j) The calculations in the Rasmussen report and the German risk study { take 
account of the expected effect of counter-measures and are thus not directly 
comparable with those used here. 
The results have been used to place the six sites in an order of merit, 
depending on the factors discussed above and then to calculate the ratios of 
the selected quantity, eg collective absorbed dose, at the "best" site and 
each of the other sites. This ratio has. been called the site ratio. 
5.2.1 Site Ratios Based on Collective Absorbed Dose 
• 
For accidents releasing up to about 1% of the volatile fission products in the 
core of a reactor with an electrical output of 1200 MW, the site ratios range 
up to about 10 for all the accident distributions considered. This range is 
reduced if larger accidents are included and if small doses at large distances 
are included in the calculation of collective absorbed dose. Absorbed doses 
below a selected limit, or threshold, have been excluded from the calculation 
of collective absorbed dose. 
• 
The use of individual sector populations for Transfynydd and Heysham changes 
the collective absorbed dose by no more than about a factor of 2 for a 
threshold of 0.3 rad. 
Similar calculations have been carried out on several other European sites and 
the results are intermediate between those of the sites studied here. 
5. 2. 2 Site Ratios Based on the Number of People Suffering Early Health 
Effects 
For a release of 1% of the volatile fission products, early health effects are 
not likely to occur at ranges beyond about 2 km in average weather conditions 
or 10 km in adverse weather. Site ratios for real sites based on the number 
of people in the mean sector range up to about 20 (for 2 km) and about 6 (for 
10 km). The figures at 2 km relate only to residents, and local transient 
populations may also be important. 
5.2.3 Site Ratios Based on the Number of People Affected by Counter-measures 
Urgent counter-measures, such as evacuation and the issue of stable iodine, 
will be considered seriously out to distances of perhaps 20 km in severe 
accidents, although the level of risk between 10 and 20 km is likely to be 
small. Site ratios based on the population out to 20 km are thus of some 
interest. For the average sectors they range up to about 15. 
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5.2.4 The Effect of the Worst Sector 
The use of the worst sector increases the number of people within the relevant 
distances, by a factor of up to about 10, but has little effect on the site 
ratios. 
5.3 Existing Siting Policies 
Site selection in all countries takes account in various ways of all the 
relevant features of the site and its surroundings. In some countries, 
nurner ical criteria are used to assess the suitability from the point of view 
of radiation protection of the various sites that are otherwise feasible. In 
other countries, the radiation protection features, in common with most other 
features, are dealt with non-quantitatively. All these aspects of siting 
policy are under review in Europe and in the United States and since the 
European review is not yet complete and only tentative proposals have appeared 
in the US, we have not thought it right to attempt any comment on existing 
siting policies or on their possible development. 
5.4 The Effect of Multi-Reactor Sites 
Many sites have two or four reactors and there have been proposals for large 
nuclear parks containing many reactors and possibly including fuel fabrication 
and reprocessing plants. Although reactors and plants on such sites would be 
subject to common-mode failures initiated by those external events that affect 
the entire site, e.g. earthquakes or floods, sites subject to such events 
could be avoided, or the individual plants provided with adequate protection. 
In addition, the protection systems of such plants can be such as to make it 
highly unlikely that an accident occurring at one plant would affect the safe ~ 
operation or shut-down of other plants on the same site. Thus there seems no 
reason to assume that the magnitude of accidental releases would be altered by 
grouping the plants together. 
By contrast, the overall probability of an accident on the site is increased 
as the number of plants is increased. The simplest approach is simply to add 
the probabilities for each reactor and plant. This is mathematically 
acceptable since all the probabilities are small. However, this approach 
ignores any contribution from common-mode failures and any benefit from a 
strong site management. 
In practice, the presence of two or four reactors on a site does not signifi-
cantly alter the siting assessments and is likely to have management 
advantages. The concept of a nuclear park offers further advantages in 
relation, for example, to physical protection, waste storage, shipping and 
disposal, fuel movements, and possibly regional planning. In practice, the 
siting of nuclear parks will be decided by such considerations and by those of 
engineering and economics rather than by the radiation protection aspects 
exclusively considered here. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The quantitative effect of site selection in the states of the European 
Community is not as large as it would be in a more sparsely populated area. 
For the number of long-delayed health effects, the ratio between sites is :• 
likely to be no more than 10. For the number of early health effects, which 
will occur only after very severe accidents, or for the number of people 
affected by counter-measures, the factor between sites may be somewhat 
greater, up to about 15. 
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• 
(3) 
Site slection is at its most effective in influencing the consequences of 
accidents of a moderate severity. Some of the consequences of very serious 
accidents will extend to considerable distances where the differences between 
-._ sites is not great. Since these serious accidents are also likely to be the 
most rare, their importance in site selection is not great. The choice of 
sites is thus principally influenced by the moderate scale of accidents which 
affects only the near-in population and which gives emphasis to the importance 
of a short-range low-population zone for which emergency plans can be designed 
to be highly effective. 
5.6 Recommendations 
1. Siting policy and practice is predominantly a question for Member 
States, but some reactor sites are near to state boundaries. We therefore 
recormnend that the Commission should arrange for discussions between Member 
States with the aim of encouraging a consistent underlying approach. It is 
also important that there should be discussion between Member States when it 
is proposed to site a reactor in the vicinity of a state boundary. 
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CHAPI'ER 6 
EMERGENCY PLANS 
Many different kinds of accidents of different degrees of severity can occur 
on a nuclear site. Such accidents may range from minor plant faults or minor 
incidents involving radioactivity or radiation exposure, through serious 
failures causing major plant damage or serious exposures of workers, up to 
accidents causing major damage to plant and releases of radioactivity off-
site. The emergency plans must be able to deal with all these situations. 
They must be designed to limit the damage to the plant and to provide 
protection for the workers on site and the surrounding public. 
6.1 Basic Functions of Emergency Plans 
The following distinct features of emergency services can be identified:-
(1) the provision of high quality specialist expertise in support of 
the plant management. 
(2) the safe shut-down of the affected plant, continued heat removal, 
and the continued safe operation of the rest of the site; 
(3) damage control, rescue, fire-fighting; 
(4) radiation protection on-site; 
(5) evaluation of the likely course of events and the prediction of 
radiation doses off-site; 
(6) initiation and operation of counter-measures. 
On a longer time scale 
(7) adjustment and final withdrawal of counter-measures 
(8) provision of data for the retrospective assessment of health 
consequences; 
(9) provision of data for scientific and engineering studies. 
Of the first six of these functions, all but the first involve detailed 
information and executive action on site, and must be the direct 
responsibility of the operating management, supplemented by specialised help 
(Item 1) as soon as possible, and by local services where early off-site 
action is required. As the situation develops, additional resources will 
become available and the responsibility for off-site action may be transferred 
to other authorities. Such transfers must always be formal and unequivocal. 
On site, the senior operating management will progressively take over from 
those initially in charge, but Headquarters staff should act only as advisers 
unless they formally relieve the site management of their normal function. 
The responsibilities and lines of command, together with the procedures for 
varying them, must be clearly set out in the emergency plans. 
Items (7), (8) and (9) will usually be collaborative responsibilities, but the 
emergency plans should include the initiation of these functions and there 
should be arrangements for ensuring that they are carried through to a 
conclusion. The information problems of emergencies and the need for good 
communication arrangements are dealt with in Chapter 7. 
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6.2 The Need for Multiple Control Centres 
Practical experience of serious accidents, from the reactor fire at Windscale 
in 1957 to the accident at Three Mile Island, has emphasised the need for more 
than one control centre and for the clear demarcation of control centre 
functions. Control centre staff have to deal with the receipt and analysis 
of incoming data, the executive conduct of operations, and the transmission of 
information to other centres and authorities. The public, the press, 
national and local authorities with (or sometimes without) relevant 
responsibilities, and political figures will all be attempting to extract 
information from those concerned with the accident. A system of multiple 
control centres can structure these requests and protect the vital operational 
functions from excessive external interference. (See also Chapter 7). 
No single structure of control centres has yet emerged as being generally 
preferred, but it is reconunended that a choice should be made using the 
following structure as a starting point. The operating management will need 
control centres, possibly, but not necessarily, in separate locations, for the 
following activities:- · 
(1) plant operations; 
(2) emergency site operations; 
(3) on-site radiation protection; 
(4) off-site radiation protection including monitoring and the control 
of the initial counter-measures; 
(5) headquarters control and information functions (at a centre 
preferably located near, but not at, the affected site). 
The detailed delineation of these activities will be closely related to the 
structure of the operating line management. 
Activities 4 and 5 above are major interfaces between the operating utility 
and the outside world. In addition, there will always be several regulatory 
authorities and national advisory bodies closely associated with a serious 
accident on a nuclear site. These, and other organisations providing support, 
or making measurements, should be linked into a coherent system of control 
centres and should refrain from operating independently. 
For this network of control centres to be effective, there must be a well 
developed and rehearsed system of communication. Telephone and radio may well 
be essential, but important information and numerical data should be 
transmitted, at least in confirmation, by systems producing hard copy. These 
communication systems should be secure against overloading by unofficial uses, 
for example, by the media. 
6.3 Counter-measures 
One of the problems facing an incident controller is that of deciding whether 
to initiate counter-measures to protect members of the public, and if so, over 
what area. Counter-measures may include evacuation, the use of stable iodine 
to reduce the effects of radioisotopes of iodine, and ·the control of 
foodstuffs, especially milk. Counter-measures are indicated if the levels of 
dose would otherwise be serious, and if they are likely to be effective in 
reducing doses. In principle, it is the magnitude of the dose reduction that 
should be critical, but in practice, emphasis is given to the level of dose 
that would be received in the absence of counter-measures. There is then an 
implicit assumption that counter-measures, if applied, will be effective. 
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The greatest difficulty in making decisions about counter-measures is posed by 
the need to forecast the course of an accident and thus to estimate doses and 
dose reductions from situations that have not yet arisen. For this reason, 
emergency plans should include arrangements for the initiation of the first 
phase of counter-measures in terms of plant conditions, as well as in terms of 
. measured releases of activity or environmental measurements. 
Once the need for counter-measures has been established, it is necessary to 
define the area over which they should be applied. Unless there are obvious 
geographical factors, such as rivers, the outer limit of the area will be 
somewhat arbitrary and may give rise to anxiety. As the scale of counter-
measures increases, so does the complexity of the measures themselves. For 
example, if evacuation is to be carried out it is important that those moved 
should be transferred to a position at least three times as far from the 
source of the accident as the outer limit of the evacuated area. Similarly, 
incoming supplies of foodstuffs must have an origin far enough away from the 
accident to have only low levels of radioactive contamination. 
In making plans in advance, and in taking decisions at the time of an 
accident, it is very desirable to have quantitative guidance on the initiation 
and scale of counter-measures. Several countries have adopted quantitative 
values of absorbed dose, or of concentrations in foodstuffs or air, above 
which counter-measures should be very seriously considered, and below which 
counter-measures are not likely to be justified, unless they are easily 
applied and of little detrimental impact. In Britain, these values have been 
called emergency reference levels, and in the United States of America, 
protective action guides. In both cases they relate to the levels of dose 
that are expected to occur in the absence of counter-measures. ~ 
It is important to note that the emergency reference levels now in use are 
well below the levels of dose that might cause acute health effects. They 
correspond to a risk of late effects, notably death from cancer after a delay 
of some decades, currently thought to be in the region of one chance in a 
thousand to one chance in ten thousand, spread over about thirty years. 
Merrbers of the public who have not been subject to counter-measures, because 
their doses were below the relevant emergency reference level, need to be 
reassured that they have not thereby been exposed to substantial risks. 
The effectiveness of counter-measures will depend partly on pre-planning and 
partly on improvisation. Since some counter-measures, notably those involving 
farm produce, may extend to tens or even hundreds of kilometres, it is 
necessary to establish the scale of the largest accident for which the plans 
are intended to be effective. More severe accidents cannot be excluded, and 
will have to be dealt with by improvisation beyond the planned arrangements. 
It is apparent that the plant safety assessment, the emergency plans and the 
site characteristics should all be considered together as part of the 
licensing process. 
Finally, we consider the effectiveness of counter-measures to be heavily 
dependent upon the rational and disiplined behaviour of the local population. 
This, and the reassurance of those not subjected to counter-measures, will not 
be achieved unless the basis for emergency plans is well understood by local 
communities or, at least, by their representatives and officials, and unless .~ 
there is local trust in the competence and honesty of the local organisation. 
6.4 Local Emergency Organisation 
The emergency organisation concerned with the protection of the public must 
have the confidence of the local community. It has two principal functions -
to provide information and to provide counter-measures. Both of these 
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functions depend critically on a knowledge and understanding of the course of 
the accident and in this respect at least, the site management has a major 
part to play. Local and regional elements of government will have their own 
plans for dealing with emergencies, and it is essential that the arrangements 
for dealing with a nuclear accident should be closely integrated into these 
more conventional systems and, through them, with other community activities. 
Particular problems are inherent in the movement of special groups such as 
school children and hospital patients. Suitable plans, enlisting the support 
of teachers and of medical and nursing staffs, should be made for dealing with 
these groups. Difficulties will, however, remain at certain times of day when 
members of families may be neither at home nor in clearly defined locations 
like schools. 
There is a considerable and widespread experience of practical evacuations, 
e.g. in relation to releases of toxic chemicals such as chlorine, and this 
experience should be used in setting up evacuation plans. Conversely, the 
Community should also encourage Member States to make use of the work on 
nuclear accidents in reviewing other emergencies arrangements. 
One major function of the planning of emergency arrangements is to clarify the 
allocation of responsibilities. The details must depend on the 
characteristics of the local government arrangements, but the vital llnportance 
of the experience and specialised knowledge of the site management should be 
fully reflected in the plan. 
Once the local plans have been worked out they should be regularly exercised. 
Exercises are partly to provide practice and experience· and partly also to 
give an opportunity to review and improve the procedures. These exercises of 
local systems should sometimes be extended to include the national arrange-
ments, and, if appropriate, to the testing of transfrontier arrangements. 
6.5 Support Services 
Major nuclear accidents are too rare to justify a standing emergency team 
large enough to cope with all eventualities. Emergency plans must therefore 
include arrangements for calling in support from other nuclear installations, 
and from other organisations, including the armed forces. Except where an 
accident may call for counter-measures in a neighbouring country, there is not 
likely to be a need for support services from other countries, at least in the 
early stages of an accident. If emergency conditions persist for some time, 
more widespread calls for support may be necessary. Support services should, 
in any event, put their personnel,.either individually or in defined command 
groups, under the command of the appropriate controller forming part of the 
main emergency organisation. 
This use of external support will reduce the amount of equipment and supplies 
that need to be held in emergency stores. Nevertheless, a basic minimum stock 
should be provided to cover all the action, including counter-measures, for 
the first days at the scale needed by the largest size of accident for which 
plans are being made. 
6.6 Long-Term Plans 
Although not strictly part of emergency plans, it is necessary to make 
arrangements for long-term operations. The first of these will be the 
withdrawal of counter-measures; this will be urgent if an area has been 
evacuated, but may extend for several weeks in respect of agricultural 
produce. It will also be important to carry out scientific and engineering 
studies concerning the accident itself and its environmental consequences. 
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These studies will be helped if the national authority recognises the need for 
the collection and analysis of data beyond that needed for the immediate 
control of the emergency, and requires this need to be considered in the .,. 
establishment of emergency plans. 
6.7 Conclusions 
There have been few occasions on which it has been necessary to apply 
emergency action outside of nuclear sites, and the accident at Three Mile 
Island showed that the plans there were inadequately developed. It is also 
clear that any emergency plans must form an integral part of the arrangements 
made to deal with non-nuclear emergencies and will thus depend heavily on the 
detailed organisation in the Member States. As recently as January 1980, 
there has been a workshop on procedural and organisational measures for 
accident management at Laxenburg in Austria, and it seems likely that this has 
fulfilled the need for international discussions for the time being. 
Meanwhile, some Member States of the Community are already reviewing their 
emergency arrangements in the light of lesssons learned from the accident at 
Three Mile Island and we recommend the authorities in all Member States to 
conduct such a review. 
We have not found it easy to obtain information about the extent to which 
transfrontier emergency arrangements have been put into effect. The need for 
such arrangements has been identified in several locations by the expert group 
set up under Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty and the Commission has 
identified reactor stations near enough to national frontiers to call for such 
arrangements. We are not aware of any machinery for confirming that these 
arrangements have been made, and we recommend that the Commission should reach ~ 
an agreement with Member States for an outline of the relevant arrangements to 
be transmitted to the Commission. This would have the advantage not only of 
confirming that such arrangements have been made, but also of providing a 
central bank of information which the Commission could use in advising Member 
States on the form of such arrangements in future cases. 
6.8 Recommendations 
1. Member States should review their emergency procedures in the light of 
the experience from Three Mile Island, and the Commission should publish a 
comparative study of these procedures. 
2. Member States should ensure that their nuclear emergency plans are 
closely integrated with their general emergency plans, and include arrange-
ments for regular emergency exercises. 
3. Member States should ensure that their emergency plans are adequate to 
take care of special population groups, such as school children and hospital 
patients, and should also consider the effectiveness of such plans at times of 
day when members of families are likely to be separated. 
4. Member States should make use of the experience they gain in planning for 
nuclear accidents in reviewing their emergency plans for other situations. 
5. The Commission and Member States should set up a procedure under which • 
Mernber States inform the Commission of the arrangements for transfrontier 
emergency plans. 
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CHAPI'ER 7 
PUBLIC INFORMATION IN EMERGENCIES 
,. The accident at Three Mile Island, besides emphasizing the need for rapid, 
clear and reliable. public information, has also brought to the fore 
deficiencies in both its generation and dissemination. Both aspects are dealt 
with in this Chapter. 
• 
7.1 The Generation of Information and its Dissemination by the Utility 
The initial generation of information is primarily a matter for the operating 
utility. It is therefore imperative that each utility should have the 
confidence of the public and should provide for the assessment of the accident 
information and the preparation of statements. It should designate in advance 
a number of official spokesmen, available at any time, and forming the 
principal route for releasing information on . all events that may have an 
impact outside the utility's nuclear plants. In addition to being thoroughly 
familiar with plant design and operation, the latter preferably based on 
knowledge gained in a position of responsibility, these spokesmen should have 
training in presenting information to the public. Emergency exercises should 
be used to give them experience, which should include questioning by people 
with experience as news media representatives. 
7.2 The Press Centre 
Arrangements should be made in advance for a press centre in direct 
corranunication with the site to be available either by the utility or by the 
government agency responsible for emergency measures. This press centre 
should be sufficiently large to accomodate an adequate number of reporters and 
should be properly equipped, notably with corranunications, visual aids and 
reference materials selected in advance for the purpose of illustrating events 
on site for the layman. The requirements for size and general facilities of 
the press centre should be based on previous experience obtained in the Member 
States with national and international coverage of emergency events. Staffing 
of the press centre should be the joint responsibility of the utility and the 
national safety authority. 
7.3 The Dissemination of Information and Instructions by Government Agencies 
In the dissemination of information, a distinction should be made according to 
the intended destination. Instructions to the public in the vicinity of the 
plant should be given by responsible government spokesmen, using local means 
arranged in advance for such emergencies. All other official information 
should go through the Press Centre or the government agencies' normal outlets 
to the media. Officials presenting information to the public should be 
trained in this function and should have adequate experience in the relevant 
technical subjects. 
Because many government departments and agencies will be involved, it is 
important that an unequivocal division of responsibilities in the field of 
public information be agreed upon in advance between the utilities and these 
government agencies, and that a lead agency should be designated. It is also 
important that the arrangements should be such as to encourage consistency, 
based on shared factual knowledge, in public statements from different organi-
sations. One way of achieving this is to set up a corranon information centre. 
Merrber States should encourage their national media to hire and train staff 
capable of understanding the main aspects of nuclear power plant behaviour and 
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radiation releases. These reporters should in turn be invited by the 
utilities to visit nuclear power plants and should become acquainted with the 
utility spokesmen and the representatives of the government agencies. 
7.4 Transfrontier Problems 
While the subject of accidents in nuclear power stations adjacent to a 
national border is dealt with in Chapters 6 and 9,it is emphasized here that 
relevant agreements between the neighbouring states should include 
adequate arrangements for informing and instructing the population on both 
sides of the frontier in the vicinity of the plant. Where the same language 
is spoken on both sides of the border , care is needed in identifying the 
population to whom instructions are being given and in specifying the source 
of those instructions. 
In addition to our view stated in Chapter 6 on the Corrmunity' s role in 
promoting transfrontier agreements, we believe that the European Corrmunity 
should be ready to provide technical assistance to news media, particularly to 
local news networks that are likely to disseminate emergency information 
across the borders between Member States. 
7.5 Recommendations 
1. The national agencies of the Member States and the utilities should 
review their practices in the light of the corrments and suggestions made in 
this Chapter. 
2. The news media should examine the quality and training of the staff • 
they would be likely to use following a serious nuclear accident and should 
overhaul their links with the utilities and the national agencies. 
3. The Corrmission should encourage Member States to require the intro-
duction of formal local liaison arrangements, especially where these 
arrangements need to cross national frontiers. 
4. The Commission should consider ways in which it could provide technical 
help in advance of any accident, to news media, particularly to local news 
networks that are likely to disseminate emergency information across national 
frontiers. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE MANAGEMENT OF 'IHE RESEARCH PROGRAMMES OF 'IHE CGlMUNITY 
8.1 The Rationale of Community Research 
The individual Member States all have research programmes in the fields of 
nuclear safety and health protection, and the Community operates direct action 
programmes within the Joint Research Centre and indirect programmes by means 
of research contracts placed mainly within the Member States. 
There are several reasons for initiating and maintaining a community programme 
of research of which the following are important examples: 
Political It is desirable to have a Community programme of research 
for 1nstitutional reasons. Such a programme is evidence of the 
solidarity of Member States and indicates a common objective on the 
part of the Community. 
Corranon Requirements The existence of common requirements opens the 
door to common programmes and the reduction of duplication. 
Sharing of Cost Major projects may be too expensive for any single 
Member State and the Community can provide facilities for a multi-
national project. 
Sharing of Information and Resources A Community programme has the 
advantage of ensuring an equitable distribution of the information 
between the Member States. It also helps to group small research units 
which might not be viable separately. For smaller Member States these 
may be predominant reasons for supporting a Community programme. 
Co-ordination A Community programme can be designed to avoid major 
gaps and minimise overlapping between programme items. 
These features combine to make a Community research programme desirable and 
indeed essential. It is, in fact, the first of the Community objectives in 
Article 2 of the Euratom Treaty. In this respect, it is the political 
objectives that are predominant. 
Common requirements alone provide only partial justification for common 
programmes, and most transnational projects need justifying on grounds under 
one of the other headings. The arguments on cost sharing need to be examined 
critically, and apply principally to major projects like JET. On a smaller 
scale, international projects are usually less efficient and they tend to be 
more expensive than separate national ones, unless the latter lead to 
excessive duplication. Information sharing could be, and to a large extent 
is, effective between national programmes. Co-ordination and grouping of 
small projects is not easy to achieve without control of the funds in the 
Member States. Overlap can be controlled within the Community programme, 
but it is very difficult to influence overlaps between national programmes. 
In principle, a Community programme can avoid gaps by commissioning work which 
would not otherwise be done. On the other hand, it can be argued that a 
programme which has not been adopted by any single Member State is not likely 
to be worth initiating at the Community level • 
In conclusion, the main basis for a Community research programme is political 
and institutional, except for major projects which are too expensive to be 
conducted nationally. In addition, the smaller Member States get information 
more cheaply and more effectively than they could in the absence of a 
Community programme. It seems likely, however, that all Member States, 
including the smaller ones, regard their own national programmes as being of 
more importance than those of the Community collectively. Nevertheless, the 
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the combined national and Community programmes play a very important part 
in the achievement of a high standard of safety and it is important that they 
should be well co-ordinated, but at the same time sufficiently flexible, to 
meet the demands of changing situations. 
8.2 The Community Machinery for Establishing and Monitoring Research 
Prograrranes 
The Community research programme is intended to be an applied programme with 
strictly defined objectives. The following account refers to the programme in 
reactor safety and health protection, but much of the material applies more 
generally. 
Because the Joint Research Centre has no direct responsibility in the 
practical issues of nuclear power and radiation protection, it is essential 
for it to have close relationships with operating organisations in Member 
States and for the Member States to participate effectively in the establish-
ment of the research programme. At the same time it is also necessary for the 
Joint Research Centre to have full responsibility for the management of its 
own affairs and to be fully accountable to the Commission and thence to the 
Council. Similar considerations apply to the management of the indirect 
programme. It is in the context of these two broad requirements that we have 
examined the Community's system for managing the research programmes. 
8.2.1 The initiation of Programmes 
After extensive consultation within the Commission, the Director General of 
the Joint Research Centre prepares a proposed programme. This programme is 
discussed at three senior consultative levels -
(1) The General Advisory Committee (GAC). 
all aspects of the programme. 
This advises the JRC on 
(2) The Scientific and Technical Committee (S'IC). This advises the 
Commission on nuclear matters. 
(3) The Committee on Scientific and Technical Research (CREST). This 
deals with both direct and indirect action programmes and advises 
both the Commission and the Council on the overall orientation of 
the programmes. 
These three bodies operate independently and do not always give consistent 
advice. The GAC may also consult a number of more junior committees known as 
Advisory Committees on Programmes Management - ACPM - which are concerned more 
specifically with the programmes once they have been approved. 
Following this consultation, the Commission proposes a programme to the 
Council. At this stage, opinions are sought from the Economic and Social 
Committee and the European Assembly. The Council operates with its usual 
structure of the Atomic Questions Group and the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives. Eventually, a Council decision settles the budget 
for the programne and its major components, on the basis of a four-year 
• 
rolling programne. 4l 
8.2.2 The Management of Programmes 
Advice on the continuing management of programmes is given by the Advisory 
Committees on Programne Management. These usually consist of three members 
from each Member State, and three from the JRC or from other parts of the 
Commission - a total of thirty. 
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These ACPMs report to both the Conmission and the Council and, on request from 
the GAC, advise the GAC on new programme items, sending copies of their advice 
to the Conmission and the Council. Where relevant, they deal with both direct 
and indirect action programmes. 
There are five ACPMs in the fields of nuclear safety and health protection. 
These are:-
ACPM, Reactor Safety 
ACPM, Management and Storage of Radioactive Waste 
ACPM, Plutonium Fuel and Actinide Research 
ACPM, Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants 
ACPM, Biology and Health Protection (Radiation Protection). 
We have considered the working methods of the ACPM Reactor Safety and the ACPM 
Biology and Health Protection. The financial scale of the programmes on which 
the ACPMs advise is now about 80 MEUA. 
The ACPM, Reactor Safety, has chosen to deal with the programme in great 
detail - more detail than can be accommodated by the expertise of its members. 
To remedy this deficiency, the ACPM has had to proliferate a large number of 
working groups (ten at present) made up of a dozen or so members each, 
appointed by the ACPM. These working groups are, in practice, permanent 
conmittees advisory to the ACPM. In addition, some working groups are split 
into sub-groups and further ad hoc groups are created on a temporary basis to 
discuss specific topics. Due to the pre-existence of other harmonisation and 
co-ordination conmittees dealing with liquid metal fast breeder reactors and 
with light water reactors, some of the working groups have a double role. 
This ACPM normally meets three times a year, while the various working groups 
meet two or three times a year. Including sub-groups and ad hoc groups, the 
whole system requires something like thirty meetings per year. The overall 
attendance time, excluding travel and Conmission staff, is several thousand 
man hours J?er year. The ACPM and the working groups have required detailed 
and extensive supporting documents and the Director General of the JRC 
estimates the conmitment of research staff as in excess of 20 man years per 
year. 
By contrast, the ACPM, Biology and Health Protection, operates without working 
groups. It deals with an indirect programme and its members are drawn largely 
from institutions which are potential contractors. They are thus expert in 
the relevant fields, but not completely disinterested. It has been successful 
in establishing and maintaining a realistic programme, but has been 
disinclined to reconmend the substantial reduction in total budget that some 
of its members believe to be appropriate. 
Neither of these ACPMs provides an input of information from the Member States 
on their research programmes, as required by the Council resolution of 18 July 
1977. This resolution included among the tasks of each ACPM, ensuring "better 
liaison between implementation of the programmes at Conmuni ty level and the 
corresponding research and development work being carried out in Member 
States". 
8.3 The Views of the Expert Group on Nuclear Safety 
Nuclear safety comprises only a small part of the work of the three senior 
committees, GAC, src and CREST, and we need make no conment on the inter-
relationships. Nor do we find it necessary to conment on the ACPM, Biology 
and Health Protection. By contrast we strongly criticise the operation· of the 
ACPM, Reactor Safety. We have not attempted to find out how the present 
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situation developed and we do not wish to be critical of the members of the 
Committee 'and its working groups - given the requirements which they judged to 
have been placed on them, they had little choice. 
It is apparent, however, that there is a significant lack of understanding of 
each other's problems between the ACPM and the Commission. The Commission in 
the form of the JRC, sees the ACPM as being a very influential body which must 
be provided with the detailed information it seeks; the ACPM, or at least some 
·of its members, see their efforts frustrated by inadequate or unsuitable 
documentation and regard their recommendations as having little influence on 
the Commission. 
The combined effect of a complex committee structure and some confusion or 
disagreement about objectives and methods of work has been to impair sound 
management and to leave both the the JRC management and the Member States with 
no clear lines of accountability and a mounting sense of frustration. 
Despite these difficulties, the working parties have one incidental advantage 
in that they provide for a useful and stimulating exchange of views between 
individual scientists and engineers in the Member States and the staff of the 
JRC. If the working groups are disbanded, some attempt should be made 
to ensure that adequate personal links are maintained, and to see that the 
experience in the Member States is still available to the JRC. 
8.4 A possible alternative Method of Management of the Research Programme 
in Reactor Safety 
We have considered an alternative system of linking Member States and the JRC 
to meet the needs set out at the beg inning of this chapter. The system is 
related to reactor safety but may have relevance in other programme areas. 
The JRC produces a six-monthly technical progress report on all projects and 
is starting a regular report on the resources applied to each project. There 
is also a full technical report at the end of each definitive phase of a 
project and at final completion. We are satisfied that these documents 
provide sufficient information for Member States to make comments and give 
general guidance on the programmes as they proceed. 
The ACPM should therefore meet after the publication of each six-monthly 
progress report. The members appointed by the Member States should be 
sufficiently senior to take a broad view of the projects and to judge how the 
progress is matching the original plans and objectives. It would be useful 
for Member States to consult the Commission before making their appointments. 
There should be sufficient time between the issue of the progress report and 
the meeting to allow members to make use of consultation networks in their own 
countries. The ACPM should not call for additional written information, nor 
should it establish sub-committees in dealing with existing programmes. 
In proposing new programmes, the JRC should make a broad proposal to the GAC. 
This should be followed by more detailed proposals to the relevant ACPM. As 
with existing programnes, members of the ACPM should seek any necessary 
detailed briefing from their own countries. Exceptionally, and only on 
• 
special projects, not on whole areas, an ACPM may need to establish a short- :~ 
term ad hoc sub-group to develop views on a controversial project. 
To improve the accountability of the JRC, it should report to the GAC on the 
results from, and resources used by, each project at the completion of each 
definitive stage and at final completion. It should also continue the present 
procedure of commenting on any point where its proposals differ from those 
recommended by an ACPM. 
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To improve the flow of information from Member States to the Commission, and 
particularly to the JRC, members of the ACPM should arrange for· the 
preparation of summary reviews of the main objectives and programme items of 
research programmes in their countries. Such reviews would not be needed more 
often than annually - biennially may be sufficient. 
Finally, we would like to draw attention to the problem of research needs 
arising unexpectedly. Because of constitutional constraints, the JRC cannot 
react rapidly to changing needs and should therefore be concerned mainly with 
long-term problems. We believe, however, that some short-term capacity would 
be valuable, and that the Commission should introduce a mechanism for 
establishing a contingency reserve for indirect action, and a predetermined 
fraction of the JRC resources for direct action, to be released or redeployed 
for urgent work on the authority of the Commission following a favourable 
opinion of the STC. The other consultative bodies would be informed, but not 
consulted in advance. 
8.5 Content of the Research Programme in Reactor Safety 
We have not attempted an evaluation of the present (1980/1983) research 
programme in reactor safety. However, we did note with approval that it 
represents nearly 30% of the total CEC research budget. We also noted that 
about 8% of the reactor safety budget has been set aside for the second phase 
of the "Super SARA" project, exclusively devoted to in-reactor U:X:A studies, 
and that significant research activities are under way in the fields of fuel-
coolant interaction under accident conditions and the cooling of molten core 
debris. While endorsing such studies we point out the need to emphasise, in 
the light of the two events at Three Mile Island, the relative importance of 
small loss of coolant accidents and of insufficient core cooling with partial 
damage to the core over whole core melt-down studies (for I.WRs). It is 
self-evident that such shifts in emphasis away from large loss of coolant 
accidents and complete core melt-down must be attuned to similar trends in the 
research programmes of Member States in order to be complementary rather than 
overlapping. 
8.6 Recommendations 
1. The present system of budgeting on a four-year rolling programme should 
be continued. 
2. The ACPM, Reactor Safety, should be reconstituted without sub-groups. 
Members states should reconsider· their representation in the light of the 
necessary specialist knowledge, preferably in consultation with the 
Commission. 
3. The ACPM should normally meet only six-monthly to review the six-monthly 
progress reports and final project reports. 
4. The JRC should report to the GAC at the completion of each definitive 
stage of a project, and at final completion, showing results and resources 
used. 
5. Members of the ACPM should provide regular summaries of the objectives 
and projects of the relevant programmes in their countries. 
6. The Commission should establish contingency plans so that the JRC can 
respond on a limited scale to important, urgent new research requirements. 
7. The programme of the JRC should take account of the importance of small 
loss-of-coolant events and insufficient core cooling with partial damage to 
the core. 
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CHAPI'ER 9 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
In dealing with individual topics we have at times referred to institutional 
arrangements, but there are also some general remarks which we would like to 
make. 
9.1 Committee Organisation 
The characteristic which is most obvious to a person on first experiencing the 
working of the Community is the predilection to establish committees. An 
organisation such as the Community,- built up from sovereign Member States, 
certainly has · to use a widespread and complex network of committees to 
establish consensus views. This procedure is clearly essential at the level 
of the Council and its infrastructure, but it is also a notable feature of the 
way in which the Commission works. Since the members of committees 
established by the Commission are, in generpl, not delegates of Member States, 
but experts operating in their own right, the justification for a complex 
committee structure in which Member States are given carefully balanced 
numerical membership is less obvious. A consensus decision at such a 
committee provides no guarantee of a similar consensus of national delegates, 
and the size of the committee may well make discussions prolonged and 
ineffective. 
In addition to the problem posed by the structure of committees, there are 
difficulties posed by their sheer number. For a committee, particularly a 
large committee, to be effective, it must be serviced by a substantial ,. 
secretariat. Our own group has been well served in this respect, pa.rtly 
because we have been fortunate in our secretary, but also because we have 
insisted on a high level of support from other parts of the Commission. Other 
committees of which we are aware are not so fortunate, and the quality of 
discussion is often poor because the documentation provided is inadequate and 
often available only on the day of the meeting. 
We believe that improvements could be made by making more use of individual 
consultants or small drafting groups for the preparation of material to be 
subnitted to committees. We recognise that this introduces the risk that the 
initial papers will be biassed by the personal views of an individual or small 
group, but we think this would be better than presenting the final committee 
with ill-prepared and inadquate documentation. 
9.1.1 Recommendations 
1. The Commission should undertake a review of its committees with the aim 
of reducing their number and their size. 
2. Sufficient resources should be allocated to the remaining committees to 
ensure that adequate documentation is available for their meetings. 
3. Greater use should be made of small informal working groups and 
individual consultants in the preparation of committee documents. 
4. Greater use should be made of the remaining committees, particularly 
the Scientific and Technical Committee, for providing the Commission with 
opinions on topics which require a higher degree of expertise than can be 
commanded by the Commission' s staff. 
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9.2 The Expert Groups set up under Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty 
Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty establishes a multidisciplinary group· of 
experts appointed by the Scientific and Technical Committee from nominations 
made by Member States, with the function of advising the Commission on a 
number of topics, of which the preparation of basic safety standards for 
ionising radiations is probably the most important. This function is set out 
in Article 31 of the Treaty. 
In Article 37, Member States are required to provide the Commission with 
information about plans for the disposal of radioactive waste, so that the 
Commission may determine whether such waste is liable to result in the 
radioactive contamination of another Member State. The Commission is then 
required to consult the group of experts referred to in Article 31. In 
practice the objectives of these two Articles are sufficiently different for 
the Commission and the Scientific and Technical Committee to have chosen to 
appoint two separate groups to fulfil the distinct functions. The second 
group has become known as the Article 37 Group. 
9.2.1 The Article 31 Group 
This group meets about every 6 months and its progress of work tends to be 
slow. Its largest single programme has been the preparation of advice to the 
Commission on the basic safety standards and these have posed some 
difficulties for the group. These difficulties were somewhat exacerbated by 
the accession of the three new Member States, effective on 1 January 1973. At 
that time, the basic safety standards, which were based on international 
recommendations published in 1962, were in an advanced state of revision to 
bring them into line with international recommendations published in 1965. 
The extension of the group in 1973 delayed the completion of this revision, 
partly to take into account the views of the new members, but partly because 
the new Member States tended to take a different view of directives from that 
which had developed in the Community of six. The new Member States expected 
directives to be applied literally, while the original Member States were 
content to apply the intention rather than the literal wording. Although this 
interpretation was in line with the definition of a directive, the degree of 
administrative detail in the basic safety standards caused a great deal of 
discussion on the problems of applying such detailed requirements to different 
legislative structures. 
The directive bringing the basic safety standards into line with the 1965 
international recommendations was finally adopted by the Council in June 1976, 
but, within a year, new international recommendations were published. The 
Article 31 group set up a small drafting team to prepare a revised text and 
this was submitted by the Commission to the Council in June 1979. Despite the 
preliminary work, there was still not full agreement between the Member States 
and a technical working party of the Atomic Questions Group was needed to 
resolve the differences. 
9.2.2 Conclusions on the Article 31 Group 
The Article 31 group, with its multidisciplinary membership, provides a sound 
basis for giving opinions to the Commission over a wide range of topics in the 
field of radiation protection. 
A considerable amount of time is spent in the· discussion of directives because 
of the different attitudes to directives by Member States, and because the 
basic safety standards directive goes into great detail about methods of 
control, whereas a directive ought to be in a form which is "binding as to the 
results to be achieved upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but 
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shall leave to the national authority the form and methods" (Euratom Treaty, 
Article 161) • 
9.2.3 The Article 37 Group 
The Article 37 group differs from the Article 31 group in that it deals 
principally with specific case studies rather than with general principles. 
Possibly as a result of the application of the basic safety standards, the 
Article 37 Group found that almost all examples of the discharges of 
radioactive waste from installations were small enough not to influence other 
Member States. and they concluded that their principal effort should be devoted 
to the discussion of the radioactive material released from a nuclear 
installation in the event of an accident. This interpretation of the term 
"waste" has given rise to difficulties because an accidental release differs 
from a deliberate discharge of waste in being uncontrolled. A Member State 
can therefore give no guarantee about the limit of such a discharge. In 
practice, Member States have provided their assessment of the amount of 
material which would be released from certain typical accidents, but there has 
been little uniformity in the basis of estimating such releases. The Group 
has therefore been trying to establish, at least for light water reactors, a 
set of hypotheses for consistently evaluating the consequences of an accident. 
This will then provide a uniform basis for the Conunission in using the 
material from a Member State to assess the potential radioactive contamination 
of another Member State. It should not be necessary for the Group to 
undertake any reappraisal of the safety assessments carried out by the 
operators and regulators in the Member States. 
9.2.4 Conclusions on the Article 37 Group 
If "waste" is interpreted in its conventional way, the requirements of Article 
37 of the Euratom Treaty are unrealistic, because of the small discharges of 
radioactive waste that, in practice, take place from nuclear installations. 
The extension of the definition of waste to include the material released as a 
result of an accident has led to some difficulties of interpretation, which 
are now being resolved by the Group. It might help if each Member State 
specified the scale of release for which it required effective emergency 
provisions in the environment of the site within its own boundaries. The 
effect on other Member States of a release of this magnitude could then be 
assessed by the Article 37 Group and recommendations made to the Commission on 
the need for a study of the effectiveness of transfrontier arrangements. 
9.2.5 Recommendations 
1. Further directives establishing basic safety standards for protection 
against ion1s1ng radiation should be expressed in more general terms 
indicating the primary objectives and standards to be achieved, but omitting 
the detailed administrative requirements that make up much of the present 
directive. 
2. The Article 37 Group should deal with the relationship between a 
specified release of radioactive material to the environment and the resulting 
radiation doses in nearby Member States.' They should not attempt to 
reappraise national safety assessments, but should require each Member State 
to certify that the magnitude of the forecast release reported to the 
Commission is the same as that used for assessing emergency procedures within 
the State's own boundaries. 
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9.3 The Separation of Promotional and Regulatory Activities 
• In most countries, both in the Comnuni ty and beyond, the role of Government in 
the early stages of developnent of nuclear energy was promotional, in the 
sense that the responsible government bodies financed, co-ordinated and 
carried out research and developnent in nuclear energy to the point where this 
new energy source could be taken over by industry and the electricity 
suppliers. The growing need for regulation and inspection was initially 
filled by the same bodies that had been and still were responsible for R & D 
and, in some cases, for demonstration plants. This was largely because of the 
almost total concentration of relevant expertise in these bodies. The 
potential danger of this dual role was perhaps first brought to the fore by 
American nuclear critics, who felt that their questions on the dangers of 
nuclear power were not given adequate attention by the USA Atomic Energy 
Comnission. The subsequent decision to dissolve this body and form separate 
agencies for energy R & D {Energy Research and Developne,nt Agency) and for 
nuclear regulatory tasks {Nuclear Regulatory Comnisssion) was followed to 
varying extents and in various modes by all EEC Member States. These changes 
reflected the growing awareness that the combination of promotional and 
regulatory activities within one agency would impair public confidence. 
The situtation in the Comnission is somewhat different, because the Commission 
has no direct regulatory function. Nevertheless, it does seek to influence 
the regulatory arrangements in Member States and would be wise to keep under 
review both its organisational arrangements for nuclear safety and health 
protection and the relationship of these arrangements with its. promotional 
activities. · 
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CHAPTER 10 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONLUSIONS 
Most of our recorranendations and conclusions are included in the relevant 
chapters of our report and the most important recommendations are summarised 
below. In addition, however, we have thought it right to express some general 
conclusions based partly on our work as a group and partly on our collective 
general experience. 
10.1 Principal Recommendations 
Our detailed. recommendations are set out in the following sections of the 
report: 
2.4; 2.5.1; 3.4; 4.2; 5.6; 6.8; 7.5; 8.6; 9.1.1; and 9.2.5. 
In more general terms, we emphasise the following points: 
1. The reactor at Three Mile Island was vulnerable to certain kinds of 
operator error. European designs are not vulnerable to the same extent. 
Nevertheless, the accident at Three Mile Island provided some important 
lessons for the designers as well as the operators of nuclear power plants, 
and the Commission and the Member Stat'es should review both aspects. 
2. The fact that transients closely similar to that which initiated the 
accident at Three Mile Island had occurred and been reported earlier, but had 
gone unnoticed by both the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Metropolitan .. 
Edison, underscores the importance of the reliable transmission of significant 
information about relevant abnormal events between operators. That 
information should also be recorded in easily available user-orientated data 
banks for the systematic storage of abnormal events at nuclear stations. We 
recommend that there should be a definite role for the Commission in the 
establishment of such a data bank, or network of data banks, serving utilities 
and safety authorities throughout the Community. 
3. The siting of nuclear power plants in Europe has only a limited part to 
play in protecting the population from the effects of accidents. Both the 
Commission and the Member States should work towards a consistent approach to 
siting, especially of installations near national boundaries. 
4. Effective emergency plans and the associated supply of information to 
the public can achieve a significant reduction in the consequences of an 
accident. The accident at Three Mile Island demonstrated substantial 
weaknesses, some of which also exist in Europe. To reduce the weaknesses, we 
have made recommendation in Chapters 6 and 7 and now emphasise the following 
points: 
a) The Commission should publish a comparative study of the emergency 
procedures presently in use in the Member States. 
b) National licensing authorities should include a review of the 
plans defining the operating utilities' role and organisational 
structure during emergencies as part of the procedures preceding 
the granting of future operating licences. 
c) Both the Member States and the Commission should review their 
roles in improving the transmission of information to the public 
in the event of an emergency. 
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5. The institutional arrangements of the Community are necessarily 
complex. Nevertheless, the Commission should consider the extent to which it 
could improve its ability to respond rapidly to nuclear research needs and 
should also review the scale of its structure of committees and the adequacy 
of the technical and administrative services which it provides to committees. 
10.2 General Conclusions 
Like every other large scale source of useful heat, nuclear energy carries the 
potential to do harm and must, therefore, be treated with both care and 
respect. No amount of care will totally eliminate the risks of this, or any 
other sort of energy, but we have concluded, from our work and from our more 
general experience, that public health and safety would not benefit and might 
well suffer significantly from the replacement of nuclear energy by other 
readily available sources of energy. 
As experience develops, additional safety measures will become available. 
Whenever these can be applied without unreasonable difficulty, they ought to 
be applied. we expect the Commission of the European Communi ties to play a 
part in developing and encouraging these additional safety measures. It will 
not always be practicable to apply these improvements to earlier plants, but 
safety is not an absolute concept, and the developnent of improvements for 
future plants does not invalidate the safety of earlier ones. 
Fears are sometimes expressed about th~ problems posed by nuclear energy in 
fields other than those discussed m this report. We have in mind 
particularly civil liberties, international relations and some aspects of 
environmental protection. We do not wish to comment on these problems beyond 
expressing our firm belief that adequate solutions are either available or can 
be found, at least to the extent that the problems are specific to nuclear 
energy. We are finally led to the conclusion that nuclear sources should 
continue to play a significant part in the supply of Europe's energy. 
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II 
(Acts lt'bost: publication iJ not obligatory') 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION DECISION 
of 16 May 1979 
relating to the setting-up of a group of high-level independent experts in the 
field of nuclear safety 
(79/520/Euratom) 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Committee, 
Whereas the Commission, following an accident that 
occurred on 28 March 1979 in a nuclear power st~on 
situated in the United States of America, requested its 
staff competent in the field to provide it with a report 
on the C3uses and the consequences of that accident ; 
Whereas the Commission, on approving this report, 
considered that Community action in the field of 
nuclear safety, both from the standpoint of the installa-
tions themselves :~nd that of the protection of the 
;:-ublic and the environment, would have to be intensi-
fi~d and for this purpose it is advisable to entrust a 
select group of independent experts with the task of 
carrying out a general review of the present situation 
regarding nuclear safety within the Community, 
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:' 
Article 1 
1. A select group of independent high-level experts 
in the f;eld of nuclear safety, hereinafter called the 
'Group', shall be set up. 
2. The members of the Group shall be appointed 
by the Commission in a personal capacity, it being 
understood that they may not belong to bodies having 
a direct economic interest in nuclear energy. 
A senior official of the Commission may be appointed 
as a member of the Group. The other members 
appointed shall not be servants of the Communities. 
Article 2 
·1. The task of the Group shall be to advise the 
Commission on all problems relating to the present 
situation regarding nuclear safety within the Commu-
nity, including its implications where radiation protec-
tion is concerned, and to evaluate the activities 
conducted by Community institutions in this field for 
the purpose of formulating any suggestion that may 
serve as a basis for specific measures to be taken by 
the Commission. It shall forward in any case a report 
on its activities to the Commission before 31 
December 1979. 
2. The Group shall in particular : . 
- examine safety standards and criteria, practices and 
regulations in force and/or in preparation in the 
Member States and evaluate the procedures for 
Community action in progress with a view to their. 
harmonization, including the results already esta-· 
blished in their inventorization. 
- study the procedures .for a Community system of 
information on accidents, incidents and abnormal 
occurrences at nuclear power stations, 
- evaluate the present application of Chapter III of 
the Euratom Treaty (health and safety), and in 
particular Article 37 thereof (release of radioactive 
waste), 
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evaluate actlVltles carried on hitherto with regard 
to the siting of nuclear power stations and the 
main principles of operational· protection for the 
population (emergency plans) with a view to their 
strengthening at Community level, 
- examine problems associated with the training of 
staff employed in the operation of nuclear power 
stations, and more specifically staff assigned to 
duties involving safety and health protection, both 
from the point of view of harmonizing practices 
and regulations in force in the Member States and 
from that of promotional activities to be pursued 
directly by the Commission, 
- evaluate research and development programmes in 
the field of nuclear safety and health protection 
either in progress or planned in the Community 
in order to intensify them where appropriate in 
certain fields, 
provide a general overview of the manner in 
which nuclear safety is organized within the 
Community and to suggest possible institutional 
formulae designed to separate authorities respon-
sible for the development of nuclear energy from 
those entrusted with the elaboration of regulations 
concerning the safety of nuclear installations. 
Article 3 
The term of office /of the Group shall expire on 31 
December 197'1. It may be extended. 
The list of members shall be published by the 
Commission in the Official Jom·ntt! of tbe Europwn 
Communities for information. 
Article 4 
The Commission shall provide secretarial services for 
the Group. 
Article 5 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 194 of 
the Treaty, the members of the Group shall be 
required not to reveal information which has come to 
their knowledge by reason of the Group's work. 
· Artide 6 
This Decision shall enter into force on the day 
following its publication in the Ojfifi,i/ Joumal of 
tbe European Communitit:s. 
Done at Brussels, 16 May 1979. 
For tbe Commission. 
Guido BRUNNER 
Member of tbe Commission 
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(Acts whose publication is not obligaiory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION DECISION 
· of 2 October 1979 
amending Decision 79/510/Euratom as regards the term of office of a group of 
high-level independent experts in the field of nuclear safety 
(19/828/Euratom) 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 
Having regard to Commission Decision 79/520/Euratom of 16 May 1979 relating to the 
setting up of a group ·of hi.;h-level independent experts in the field of nuclear safety ('). 
and in particular Article 3 thereof, 
Whereas it is necessary to extend to 31 May 1980 the term of office of the group of 
experts set up in accordance with Article 1 of the said Decision 79/520/Euratom so as to 
enable the group to carry o Jt the task thereby entrusted to it, 
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS : 
Article 1 
The term of office of the group, as specified in Article 3 of Decision 79/520/Euratom, is 
hereby extended to 31 May 1980. , ' 
Article 2 
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official 
journal of the European Communities. 
·' . Done at 'Brussels, 2 October 1979. 
(I) OJ No L 141, 9. 6. 1979, p. 26 .. 
For the Commission 
Guido BRUNNER 
Member of the Commission 
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